We recently suggested in TREE that recent elements of invasion biology discourse might be categorised as cases of more general science denialism [1] . We did not intend to be provocative, but welcome the opportunity this has presented for both ourselves and others [2] [3] [4] [5] to reflect on their own science and values with respect to invasion biology and invasive alien species (IAS) management (Box 1).
That IAS have been disproportionately implicated in extinctions since 1500 AD [7, 8] and are prevalent in current biodiversity threats [9] is supported by all the available evidence. Briggs [2] argues against this evidence, going so far as to suggest that IAS bring stability to ecosystems, when this is evidently not the case. His position is undermined by his evident confusion of all exotic (introduced, alien) species with the subset of those which are invasive (Box 1), and between the contemporary epidemic of biological invasions and historical (prehuman) species 'invasions' (colloquial use of the term), arguing that there is no material difference between these two groups. We do not disagree that natural species colonisations have a critical role in maintaining or increasing species richness, but the current spate of human-mediated invasions differ in rates, processes, and mechanism compared with natural [ 7 9 _ T D $ D I F F ] colonisations [10, 11] . Adaptive radiations are not offsetting the current rate of extinctions by invasive species [ 8 0 _ T D $ D I F F ] nor indeed by any other global change threat.
Tassin and colleagues have all published critically on invasion biology in the past (references in [1] ). We do not advocate that everyone questioning the evidence for negative impacts or valuation of a Box 1. Definitions In all science, clarity of definitions is imperative, and invasion biology is no exception [6] .
Alien versus Invasive
These two terms are not synonymous, and should not be used or interpreted interchangeably. Alien species (often called 'exotic' or 'introduced') are those whose presence in a region is attributable to human actions that have enabled them to overcome barriers to their natural dispersal. Alien species must have impacts on the recipient ecosystem simply by their presence (i.e., on the availability of space, food, water, or other resources for other species), but their impacts can be positive and negative, often a combination of both, and potentially benign overall. By contrast, invasive species are generally taken to be that subset of alien species that are determined overall to have negative impacts: not all alien species are invasive.
[ 7 6 _ T D $ D I F F ] Disagreementand Denial
Disagreement can arise among scientists from scientific uncertainty or among stakeholders from different beliefs and values. By contrast, denial, in the scientific sense, arises when scientific evidence is disregarded, or motivations are disingenuous. Consensus on scientific paradigms can exist despite disagreement on interpretations of patterns and processes within.
Invasion and Colonisation
We can distinguish between biological invasions by alien species, which occur after a species is transported by humans outside its native range, and natural invasions, which are better referred to as colonisations, whereby a species expands its range to a new location under its own powers of dispersal. non-native species as invasive should be labelled a denier, just as other scientists seeking precision in other topics where science denialism is present would not necessarily be so. Indeed, we explicitly distinguished between informed scepticism and denialism, and Tassin and colleagues may prefer to identify themselves in the former group. To reiterate our original point, science denialism occurs when 'evidence is disregarded, or motivations are disingenuous'. Combining scientific fact and social values in the definition of IAS need not cause a 'breakdown', as Tassin and colleagues argue. Tools and processes exist to robustly manage expectations and policy where facts and values interact [12] .
We do disagree with Tassin and colleagues' argument that the threat of IAS is restricted to islands and freshwater systems, because, once again, evidence of this is to the contrary [9] . They also appear to confound the distinction of alien and benign from alien and invasive species (Box 1). We do not share their optimism that regional increases in species richness caused by species introductions offset the erosion of global species richness, or their pessimism about the inevitability of these global change processes, when bold initiatives, such as removing some IAS from an entire country, are currently being supported [13] . The rapid rates of biological change projected from biological invasions and climate change are not 'inevitable and essential to the survival of species and maintenance of ecosystem services' [3] , but instead a key driver of the greatly elevated current rates of species extinction, and a likely cause of collapse of ecosystem services [14] . Nevertheless, we consider discourses such as this 'a vibrant and robust dialogue on the negative and potentially also any positive impacts of IAS' [1] .
By contrast, we found that the response of Davis and Chew [4] was unnecessarily focussed on attacking the discipline and scientists rather than the science itself.
Their criticisms are familiar and have been well addressed elsewhere [15] . Rather than a last stand, we find more reason than ever to be optimistic about invasion biology as a scientific discipline, and about the prospects for global action on the threat of IAS, with announcements such as the 2016 Honolulu Challenge (http://www.iucn.org/theme/species/ our-work/invasive-species/honoluluchallenge-invasive-alien-species). The origin of a species is critical in determining the appropriate management response [13] . We urge academics such as Davis and Chew [4] to distinguish philosophical details from pragmatic necessities: is anyone really arguing against action towards preventing IAS impacts? We are glad that Davis and Chew acknowledge that nature is not dichotomous, such that invasive species with overwhelmingly negative impacts, and authors with extremely denialist views, are but one extreme of a long continuum.
Across the continuum of valuations of IAS, we agree with Crowley and colleagues [5] that 'disagreement about invasive species does not equate to denialism'. Similar to Crowley and colleagues, we advocate for 'good quality public, or indeed scientific, debate', as one of us (J.C.R.) [ 8 1 _ T D $ D I F F ] has argued elsewhere that scientific communication must be a twoway dialogue [6] and advocated the use of tools, such as social impact assessment (SIA), for enhancing IAS management [16] . Just as there exists scientific consensus on evolution, and on human-induced climate change, we believe that it also exists on the negative impacts of invasive species, but that this consensus does not preclude debate on scientific uncertainty within each discipline (Box 1). However, negotiating the tensions of perceived consensus alongside scientific uncertainty are critical, especially in the public's eye [17] . Furthermore, denial must always be distinguished from disagreement (Box 1), because considering it only as another type of disagreement plays in to a dialogue that denial statements are legitimised.
The typology of believers and deniers has been stark in other scientific arenas, and it is important that we learn from experiences such as in climate change politics and do not allow ourselves to become entrenched into such dichotomous typologies [17] . We maintain that invasive species denial is increasing, as the topic of IAS and their management becomes more mainstream, but like other scientists Piaggio et al. [1] recently outlined the role that new synthetic biology technologies may play in addressing a myriad of issues in conservation. One area they focused on was the possibility of using gene drive [2] technologies to control invasive rodents. Specifically, they outlined work now underway in mice that seeks to link a male-determining gene, Sry [3] , to the t-complex gene drive [4] to produce predominantly male progeny. The idea has merit, but there are a variety of challenges to surmount that the authors did not address, likely because of paper length restrictions. We air here some of these with the goal of stimulating further thought and discussion on a topic that is emerging as an area of contention in the conservation biology domain.
Research in the 1990s showed it is possible to produce infertile phenotypically male mice by inserting a portion of the Sry gene into XX female embryos [3] . Thus the proposal to use Sry linked to the t-complex to change sex ratios as outlined by the authors in their Figure 1 is feasible. Unfortunately, as presented, this idea is clouded by several significant unknowns. The most important of these is uncertainty about the fertility and fitness of XY + Sry individuals. These individuals carry two functional copies of the Sry gene in different chromosomal locations, and the fitness of these individuals is unknown. While we know of some rodents that carry multiple copies of Sry [5], these are all on the Y chromosome and are likely controlled in concert. If the fitness of these mutant mice is affected in any way then it could be a challenge for ongoing persistence of control.
A further challenge concerns the use of the t-complex. In its wild-type form this meiotic distorter confers a significant level of fitness disadvantage to both males and females, with carrier males showing a reduced ability to hold territories [6] . These fitness disadvantages may threaten the ability for such drives to invade and persist in populations, compromising their potential as self-sustaining agents of population control. We thus encourage explicit modeling of the efficacy of such a system before significant investment is made in the development of these mice.
Related to the above, further problems in achieving persistent control will emerge if females exhibit any mate choice against gene-edited males. There is strong evidence in mice and other rodents for heterozygosity-based mate choice [7] , and it will therefore be important for the success of any such control strategy that any mice released are not derived from highly inbred stocksa goal that will run counter to most high-throughput breeding operations. We are also unsure whether this approach would translate to other rodent systems. The t-complex and its effects are well documented in mice, notably Mus musculus, but it is not clear whether the t-complex has similar effects as a meiotic distorter in the 147 rodent species currently considered as pests [8] , with its utility in rats being particularly important in a conservation context.
A final challenge is that, even if initially successful, the control strategy outlined will only persist while the Sry gene linked to the t-complex is functional. In large populations we can expect de novo loss-of-function mutations to occur in this secondary copy of the Sry that would have the effect of restoring the female phenotype. In humans 46, XY complete gonadal dysgenesis occurs at a frequency of 1 in 80 000, with 15% of cases being attributed to mutations in Sry [9] . This leads to an estimated frequency of Sry loss-of-function mutation of $1 in 500 000, which could represent a substantial risk to a gene drive aimed at controlling populations that will readily number in the millions. Add to this the possibility of compensatory mechanisms emerging because of the complexity and redundancy in the mammalian sex determination pathway, [ 3 7 _ T D $ D I F F ] such compensations might lead XY + Sry individuals to be female [9] , and XX + Sry individuals not to become male [10] . If these individuals have any reproductive potential their fitness versus the rest of the population will be high, leading to a strong selective advantage that may compromise the population control imposed by the gene drive. Again we encourage robust modeling to explore the possibility that gene drives will fail because of mutation, as has recently been undertaken for other systems [11] .
